Quinlan v. Kane: Case File (NITA) (English Edition) eBook: Rothschild, Frank D., Siemer, Deanne C., Bocchino, Anthony J.: bengalkatt.nu: Kindle-Shop. Suzi V. Kane (Author). › Visit Amazon's Suzi V. Kane Page. Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author. Are you an. Kane, der fiktive WWE-Bruder des Undertaker, erfand sich ohne Maske noch einmal neu. Nun hat Darsteller Glenn Jacobs die.
Kane V Kane Navigationsmenü
Kurz darauf gewann er zusammen mit dem Undertaker erneut die WWE Tag Team Titel, später folgten auch – im Zuge der WWE vs. Alliance-Fehde – die WCW-. Kane, der fiktive WWE-Bruder des Undertaker, erfand sich ohne Maske noch einmal neu. Nun hat Darsteller Glenn Jacobs die. Quinlan v. Kane: Case File (NITA) (English Edition) eBook: Rothschild, Frank D., Siemer, Deanne C., Bocchino, Anthony J.: bengalkatt.nu: Kindle-Shop. Suzi V. Kane (Author). › Visit Amazon's Suzi V. Kane Page. Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author. Are you an.
Quinlan v. Kane: Case File (NITA) (English Edition) eBook: Rothschild, Frank D., Siemer, Deanne C., Bocchino, Anthony J.: bengalkatt.nu: Kindle-Shop. Kurz darauf gewann er zusammen mit dem Undertaker erneut die WWE Tag Team Titel, später folgten auch – im Zuge der WWE vs. Alliance-Fehde – die WCW-. Suzi V. Kane (Author). › Visit Amazon's Suzi V. Kane Page. Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author. Are you an. Amherst College v. The confidential relationship is generally established when it appears that the grantor and the grantee were father and son. The mother of plaintiffs, Elizabeth Failing Kane, died intestate October 12, Kane was administrator of his mother's estate. At the second argument of this case, we were informed that the same judge tried the case between the defendants for the annulment of their marriage. Disclaimer: Mirror Online document Leo Org App Download not present a complete or comprehensive statement of the law, nor does it constitute legal advice.
Kane V Kane Navigation menu VideoKane vs Randy Orton- Kane Destroys \u0026 Unmasks - Imposter Kane!
Kane V Kane Please Sign In or Register VideoKane and the twisted tale of May 19: WWE Playlist
Kane was to have the right to the land described in the deed for his use and benefit for life. In his cross-examination the witness Francis J.
Kane that "this is a deed referring to the quit-claim deed from plaintiffs to defendant Frank P. Kane of trust.
Kane returned to their home immediately after their marriage. As stated above, I repeat that the quit-claim deed is an ordinary quit-claim deed without any limitations, qualifications or restrictions.
The learned attorneys for plaintiffs state their position in their brief as follows:. Kane should have no beneficial interest in the property, but that he should hold the unrecorded deed rather as evidence of permission and license that the plaintiffs had given him to use such interest as they might have in the property.
The attorney who prepared the quit-claim deed represented the estate of the mother. All of the parties seem to recognize that the father had some interest in the property.
There is no pretense whatever that any undue influence or persuasion was used by him to procure the deed. Plaintiffs claim their father expressed a fear that some of his children might sell their interest and jeopardize his possession.
To prevent that they executed and delivered the deed. They claim to have executed the deed so as to secure to their father a home for life or as long as he wanted it for a home.
There is no evidence of a trust, but rather a desire to convey a life estate. It would have been a very simple transaction to have prepared a lease or other document to effect an intention to pass a life estate.
One or more of the plaintiffs requested the attorney to draw the deed. After the deed was executed and certified, plaintiff Francis J.
Kane took the deed and delivered it to his father, defendant Frank P. Thus, we have a deed executed, acknowledged, certified and delivered voluntarily by the plaintiffs.
That deed was sufficient to convey, and did convey, all the interest that the grantors therein named owned in and to the property therein described.
The title thus conveyed can not be questioned by oral testimony of the intent of the parties. They testify among other things that defendant Frank P.
Kane agreed not to put the deed on record. The deed was not put on record until after the marriage. But that can make no difference in passing the title.
The deed was delivered, fully executed and the title passed with its delivery: Moore v. Thomas , 1 Or. Miller , Or. Kane was in possession and his ownership of the property was thereby protected.
He had the written evidence of his ownership and the physical possession of the property. These two evince his ownership and make his title complete: Or.
Huntington , 34 Or. The only consideration expressed in the quit-claim deed is one dollar. The witnesses in behalf of plaintiffs testified that no consideration was paid.
They testified that defendant Frank P. Kane agreed to keep the taxes paid and maintain the property in good repair. Plaintiffs will not be heard, however, to dispute the recital of consideration, so as to vitiate their deed: Or.
Twohy Bros. Allen , Or. The deed from plaintiffs to defendant Frank P. Kane is not ambiguous. Plaintiffs do not claim that the deed was procured by fraud.
No pretense is made that any mistake entered into the preparation, execution or delivery of the deed. The deed was prepared after the discussions between defendant Frank P.
Kane and plaintiffs. Whatever agreement or understanding was entered into merged in the deed when it was executed. It is elementary law that the deed represented the intention of the parties and that all prior discussion merged in the deed when it was executed and delivered.
Then follows two exceptions, neither of which is applicable to the case at bar: Sutherlin v. Bloomer , 50 Or. Allen , above; Jaloff v.
United Auto Indemnity Exchange , Or. Silsby , Or. See Hyland v. Oregon Agricultural Co. Justice RAND used the following language:.
The evidence of the oral agreement was properly and timely objected to. There was, then, no legal evidence before the court of any agreement that the defendant Frank P.
Kane held title to the land in controversy as trustee. Plaintiffs rely on De Vol v. Citizens' Bank , 92 Or. That case differs from the instant case in this, the trustee in the De Vol case executed the alleged trust while she held the title.
The learned justice writing the opinion expressed the principle thus:. She held the property subject to his use and disposition, and upon his order and request, she signed the deed to Whitmer in full recognition of the parol trust.
Under such circumstances, and when the trust has been so acknowledged and executed, the reason for the rule against admitting parol evidence fails, and when the reason fails the rule fails with it.
In Chance v. Weston , 96 Or. Justice BEAN, stated the ruling principle thus:. Chance was executed without authority. A trust in real estate can not be created by parol: De Vol v.
Plaintiffs also rely on Templeton v. Hollinshead , Or. This case and the citation has reference to constructive trusts. Plaintiffs rely on an express trust.
The quotation from 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence is not apt nor pertinent. This is the language there expressed:.
In the instant case there is no pretense that any of the unfair methods stated in the excerpt from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence were employed or used.
This court said in Metzger v. Guynup , Or. If the instant case disclosed that the defendant Frank P. But there is no evidence or indication of any deceit, any fraud or any misrepresentations having been used by defendant Frank P.
Kane on plaintiffs, inducing them to make the transfer. Hence, there is no place for testimony concerning an oral contract or oral understanding between them prior to the execution of the deed.
Other jurisdictions support this opinion: Price v. Brown , 4 S. Hall , A. Mower , 99 Vt. Howell , 3 Stockton's Reports 11 N. Cox , 23 W. Goff , 98 Kan.
Robbert , Misc. Every case referred to by plaintiffs, or others, intending to support plaintiffs' contentions where a parol agreement of a trust has been enforced has been based on fraud or mistake, part performance or the execution of the alleged trust by the trustee, or a declaration of trust executed voluntarily by the alleged trustee while he held the legal title.
It is claimed that defendant Frank P. Kane executed what is equivalent to a declaration of trust. The only instrument of that kind is a warranty deed executed by him two years after he had conveyed his interest to his then wife.
A declaration of trust or other instrument or an attempt to execute a trust must be performed while the trustee has title to the property.
A case cited as in support of the alleged trust in the instant case is Bicocchi v. Casey-Swasey Co. An examination of the last case cited clearly discloses that the parties seeking to establish a trust relied on fraud.
While the legal title to the property remained in Mazza , his creditors might have subjected it to the payment of their debts, and if they had taken proceedings by which they fixed a lien upon the property before the conveyance was made, their rights would be superior to those of Bicocchi, but, having failed to secure any right in the property itself before the conveyance was made, they can not now reach it in the hands of Bicocchi, because his right to have the property reconveyed was equally binding as were the rights of the creditors of Mazza to have their debts paid; and Mazza having conveyed the property in satisfaction of a promise to do so, that conveyance must be held to be good against the debts of the defendants in error.
The warranty deed is not a declaration of a trust, but an attempt to make a reconveyance. If plaintiffs' evidence proved a trust, defendant Frank P.
Kane should not have executed a warranty deed. If Frank P. Kane's title was encumbered with a trust he could not covenant against encumbrances, nor truthfully claim to be the absolute owner in fee.
If plaintiffs' claim is true, their father had a life estate in the land. The life estate at least was conveyed to defendant Alice W. Kane, for that deed conveyed all the interest Frank P.
Kane had in the land. If the deed from plaintiffs to Frank P. Kane should be annulled, Frank P. Kane would own his curtesy in the land which would pass to Alice W.
Kane by the deed in her favor. The warranty deed is a direct denial of a trust estate. The recitals in the warranty deed preclude defendant Frank P.
Kane from claiming that his title to the land was conditional, encumbered or in any way differed from the recitals, including the covenants of ownership and against encumbrances in the deed.
If defendant Frank P. Kane promised not to record his deed and broke that promise, he did not thereby declare a trust.
Breach of a parol agreement does not create a trust: 1 Perry on Trusts 6th Ed. Those who seek equity must do equity.
Plaintiffs concede they intended to grant a life estate to their father. Now they are asking the court in the prayer of their complaint "and that each and both of the defendants be declared to have no interest whatsoever in said property.
It is claimed that the defendant Alice W. Kane had notice of the trust agreement. The evidence upon which they rely on that behalf is set out above.
Since there was no trust agreement, there could not be notice of such. The lower court found the evidence indicated not a trust agreement but a life interest in so far as the evidence was admissible to prove anything.
In that finding I concur. The letter hereinafter set out from the attorney does not give notice of trust. On the contrary, the purpose is that by reason of the marriage defendant Mrs.
Kane would have some interest which would cause complications. She did have an inchoate dower interest. Van Hoomissen writes "since the title stands in your name the law perhaps would cause complications to arise as to the rights of Mrs.
Kane that there was a trust agreement. It undoubtedly refers to the interest Mrs. Kane had in the property as the wife of defendant Frank P.
Kane by operation of law. The only evidence adduced by plaintiffs in support of their allegations of fraud is the fact that defendant Frank P.
Kane executed and delivered the deed conveying said premises to his wife, the defendant Alice W. Kane, within a month after they were married to each other; and the testimony of defendant Frank P.
Kane that he signed that deed without knowing what the instrument was, because he was told by her to sign the instrument and that said instrument was reconveying the property to his children, the plaintiffs.
She disputes the testimony of defendant and denies that she was present when he executed the deed.
She adduced testimony of several witnesses who testified that defendant Frank P. Kane stated that he had deeded the property to his wife, the defendant Alice W.
James J. Crossley, one of the attorneys for defendant Alice W. Kane, corroborates her to the extent that he prepared the deed at the request of the defendant Frank P.
Kane; that his wife was not present when the deed was executed by said Kane; that he read the deed carefully to said Frank P.
Kane and after having read it to him he assented to the deed as being according to his intentions. The stenographer in the office of the said Crossley also corroborated defendant Alice W.
Kane to this extent that she was not present when Frank P. Kane executed the deed. The evidence is overwhelming that he deliberately executed the deed to Alice W.
He acted very foolishly but that does not justify overturning the law. Parties relying on fraud to void an instrument must prove their allegations of fraud.
It is significant in the light of the evidence of some three disinterested witnesses to the effect that defendant Frank P.
Kane soon after delivering the deed had told them he had conveyed the premises to his wife, defendant Alice W. Kane, and to one or more of them stated his reason for his act.
We can not believe his testimony that he did not know what he was signing when he signed the deed, or that he thought he was conveying the land to plaintiffs.
Among other things they caused their attorney Mr. Van Hoomissen to write the following letter to the defendant Frank P. Elizabeth Kane to yourself and to your children has occasioned your children interviewing me as to rectifying the present status of the title of said estate, that is to say, since the title stands in your name the law perhaps would cause complications to arise as to the rights of Mrs.
Kane, which would be contrary to the understanding at the time the children conveyed their interest to you. Its date shows the letter was written within two days after the marriage of the defendants to each other.
According to the testimony of all of the plaintiffs in regard to their intention, that intention was to give to their father the possession and use of the real property during his lifetime, except that plaintiff Francis J.
Kane said he was to have it for as long as he wanted it for a home. Plaintiffs demand in their complaint "that each and both of defendants be declared to have no interest whatsoever in said property.
Plaintiff Francis J. Kane was administrator of his mother's estate. Said property was the home of defendant Frank P. Kane and his deceased wife.
It was their actual place of abode. Plaintiffs attempted to include the furniture in that home as having been delivered to their father under the alleged trust arrangement.
We are not advised how much of said furniture was exempt. In all probability all the furniture belonged to defendant Frank P.
Kane and his deceased wife during her lifetime and was exempt from execution. Under the law it was the duty of the probate court of Multnomah county to set the furniture aside to defendant Frank P.
Kane as exempt property: Or. It was the duty of plaintiff Francis J. Kane to have petitioned the court for an order to set aside the exempt property to the surviving husband, defendant Frank P.
The property in litigation constituted the statutory homestead. As the surviving spouse, defendant Frank P.
As the surviving spouse he was also entitled to his curtesy interest in that property. All these interests seem to have been ignored by plaintiffs. There is no competent evidence in the record to support a trust.
I have been unable to find any evidence tending to prove that defendant Frank P. Kane promised his children, the plaintiffs, to hold the title in trust for them or to return the title to them.
Plaintiffs testify only that there was an understanding that the property would revert to them. There were expressions that were indicative that plaintiffs held the opinion that the property would be theirs when their father got through with it.
No one contemplated at that time that their father, the defendant Frank P. Kane, would remarry. If the father had died without remarrying, the property would have gone to the children.
That was the understanding and was the true condition at the time the deed from plaintiffs conveying the property to their father was made, but there is no other evidence of any agreement to that effect.
It is further claimed that because the quit-claim deed from plaintiffs to defendant Frank P. Only fill in if you are not human. Skip to content Navigation Search Sitemap.
The Message The Court can see the wood from the trees! The Case In an important case for practitioners and insurers, the Court has made clear when a homeowner will be liable for tree root damage to another property Mr and Mrs Khan own a house in Stanmore, Middlesex.
Search Publications. Username or E-mail. Keep me signed in. Forgot your password? Not a member? Some parts of this website are open only to members of the PLA.
If you would like to apply for membership please follow the links below. Berent was a sea change; prior to this, such claims were usually presented as strict liability.
Khan thus raises a number of concerns. Given the acknowledgement in Berent first instance that prior attempts to accurately predict root spread patterns with the assistance of experts had failed, is the decision in Khan inconsistent with the current approach?
Since the judgment in Khan , we have seen an increasing number of cases where claimants appear to indiscriminately rely on the case regardless of the facts.
It is important to appreciate that foreseeability is invariably fact specific, rendering the enquiry process inherently unpredictable.
If Khan can support one principle, it is that actual notice may not be a prerequisite for foreseeability in tree root nuisance cases. Nonetheless, we would argue it is only in the most exceptional cases that such a finding is suitable.
The facts of Khan are extreme; by comparison half a metre is less than the length of an average arm.
This is exceptionally close for a 10 metre tall, dominating hedge. Whilst there are unfortunately no hard and fast rules, claimants and defendants ought to consider the limits on Khan and not overlook the value of Berent.
Disclaimer: This document does not present a complete or comprehensive statement of the law, nor does it constitute legal advice.